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Sequential decomposition of repeated games
with asymmetric information and dependent
states
Deepanshu Vasal
Abstract
We consider a finite horizon repeated game with N selfish players who observe their types pri-
vately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Their actions and types jointly determine their
instantaneous rewards. In each period, players jointly observe actions of each other with delay 1, and
private observations of the state of the system, and get an instantaneous reward which is a function
of the state and everyone’s actions. The players’ types are static and are potentially correlated among
players. An appropriate notion of equilibrium for such games is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE)
which consists of a strategy and a belief profile of the players which is coupled across time and as
a result, the complexity of finding such equilibria grows double-exponentially in time. We present a
sequential decomposition methodology to compute structured perfect Bayesian equilibria (SPBE) of
this game, introduced in [1], where equilibrium policy of a player is a function of a common belief
and a private state. This methodology computes SPBE in linear time. In general, the SPBE of the game
problem exhibit signaling behavior, i.e. players’ actions reveal part of their private information that is
payoff relevant to other players.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information asymmetry among strategic agents is an important topic, which has seen some very
influential works such as [2] and [3]. Akerlof in [2] and Spence in [3] modeled a market of cars and
a job market, respectively, as instances of information asymmetry in a game, and show interesting
behavior of strategic agents derived from these models. Specifically, Akerlof in [2] showed that in
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2a market of cars, where the quality of car is known only to the seller, lower prices can drive out
good cars from the market. Spence in [3] showed that in equilibrium in a job market, a candidate can
‘signal’ her higher productivity to a potential employer by opting for higher education credentials. While
these works showed very interesting and relevant phenomena for static information asymmetry, in the
real world however, there exists many such, and even more complicated decision making scenarios
which involves strategic decision makers with dynamically evolving information asymmetry. Some
instances of such systems include: (a) in cyber-physical systems, many cyber and physical devices
are connected to each other which have different information and they make a decision to optimize
their performance objectives; (b) in a wind energy market a wind energy producer observes its own
wind production privately and publicly observes the output of other producers which also determine the
prices, and its objective is to generate output that maximizes its revenue; (c) in a social network, people
have private opinions about a topic and also publicly observe actions of others, based on which they
make a decision to maximize their utility. All such scenarios can be modeled as a dynamic game of
asymmetric information1 [4]. Such problems are gaining more interest with applications such as alpha-
go by Deepmind [5] for the symmetric information game Go, and for asymmetric/imperfect information
games such as Texas Hold’em in [6].
Dynamical systems with strategic players are modeled as dynamic stochastic games, introduced by
Shapley in [7]. Discrete-time dynamic games with Markovian structure have been studied extensively to
model many practical applications, in engineering as well as economics literature [8], [9]. In dynamic
games with perfect and symmetric information, subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) is an appropriate
equilibrium concept and there exists a backward recursive methodology to find all the SPEs of these
games (see [10]–[12] for a more elaborate discussion). Maskin and Tirole in [13] introduced the concept
of Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) for dynamic games with symmetric information, where equilibrium
strategies are dependent on some payoff relevant Markovian state of the system, rather than on the entire
history. In dynamic games of asymmetric information, there are strategic players who are affected by an
underlying process that is dynamically evolving, and the players make asymmetric observations about
that process. In such games and more generally in any dynamic multi-agent decision problem with
asymmetric information, a player’s action not just either explore or exploit the system2, as it happens in
a single agent problem, but also signal i.e. reveal part of its private information to the other players that
is payoff relevant to them.3 Some appropriate notions of equilibrium for such games is Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE) or Sequential Equilibrium (SE) [4], [10] which involve an equilibrium strategy profile
1Sometimes also referred to as dynamic games of incomplete/imperfect information.
2Exploitation refers to making a decision based on whereas exploration refers to taking action that improves the current
estimate of the state of the system even at some cost in the present, but that improves future reward.
3Equivalently, signaling occurs in such decision problems if players’ beliefs on a payoff relevant state are strategy dependent
i.e. they depend on the strategies of one or more players.
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3and an equilibrium belief profile of all the players, among other refinements. In these equilibria, the
equilibrium strategies and beliefs are coupled together through a joint fixed-point equation in the space
of strategies and beliefs for all players and for all histories of the game.4 Since the history of such games
grows exponentially, the complexity of finding equilibria of such game grows double exponentially in
time, rendering such problems intractable. We refer the reader to the Introduction section of [14] for a
thorough introduction and a brief literature survey on dynamic games with asymmetric information.
Recently, there have been a number of results on finding an information state for different classes
of such games that decomposes these games across time (in an analogous way a dynamic program
decomposes a dynamic optimization problem), and thus reduces the complexity of finding these equilibria
from double-exponential to linear in time. Authors in [14], [15], and independently, authors in [16], [17],
presented such a sequential decomposition for games to find structured perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(SPBE) and common information based perfect Bayesian equilibrium (CIB-PBE), respectively, where
each player has a type or a state that evolves (conditionally) independently of other players’ types
in a Markovian way. Authors in [18] extended those results to LQG games (i.e. with linear state
update, quadratic instantaneous costs and Gaussian random variables), and to games with conditionally
independent hidden Markovian types in [19], where instead of perfectly observing its own type, each
player makes independent noisy observations about it, respectively. Authors in [20] considered such
dynamic game with a system state and delayed information sharing pattern where each players learns
every agents private observations and actions with delay of d−steps. Authors in [17, ch. 5] generalized
that dynamic game with a Markovian state where players make a common and private observations of the
state of the system, where these observations are conditionally independent among players, conditioned
on the current state and previous action. In this paper, we consider a model that adds to this literature,
where there exists players’ types that are static and arbitrary correlated among the players.
In this paper, similar to [14], we present a backward-forward methodology to compute SPBE of
the game, where each player’s strategy is a function of the same common information belief state and
private state. These equilibria of the game are analogous to Markov Perfect equilibria (MPE) [13] of
symmetric information games.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we present the general model. In Section III, we
define information belief states, which act as the motivation for the structure of the equilibrium policies.
In Section IV, present the backward-forward methodology to compute SPBE of the game in linear time.
We discuss some remarks in Section V. We conclude in section VI.
4In comparison, Nash equilibrium for a static game is a fixed-point equation in the space of probability measures on possible
actions of the players [10]
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4A. Notation
We use uppercase letters for random variables and lowercase for their realizations. For any variable,
subscripts represent time indices and superscripts represent player identities. We use notation −i to
represent all players other than player i i.e. −i = {1, 2, . . . i − 1, i+ 1, . . . , N}. We use notation at:t′
to represent vector (at, at+1, . . . at′) when t
′ ≥ t or an empty vector if t′ < t. We use a−it to mean
(a1t , a
2
t , . . . , a
i−1
t , a
i+1
t . . . , a
N
t ) . We remove superscripts or subscripts if we want to represent the
whole vector, for example at represents (a
1
t , . . . , a
N
t ). In a similar vein, for any collection of finite sets
(X i)i∈N , we denote ×Ni=1X
i by X . We denote the indicator function of any set A by IA(·). For any
finite set S, ∆(S) represents space of probability measures on S and |S| represents its cardinality. We
denote by P g (or Eg) the probability measure generated by (or expectation with respect to) strategy
profile g. We denote the set of real numbers by R. For a probabilistic strategy profile of players (βit)i∈N
where probability of action ait conditioned on (a1:t−1, x
i) is given by βit(a
i
t|a1:t−1, x
i), we use the short
hand notation β−it (a
−i
t |a1:t−1, x
−i) to represent
∏
j 6=i β
j
t (a
j
t |a1:t−1, x
j). All equalities and inequalities
involving random variables are to be interpreted in a.s. sense.
II. GENERAL MODEL
We consider a discrete-time dynamical system with N selfish players in the set N
△
= {1, 2, . . .N}.
We consider finite horizon T
△
= {1, 2, . . . T } with perfect recall. The system state is x = (x1, . . . , xN ),
where x ∈ X is distributed as
P (x) = Qx(x) (1)
where at = (a
1
t , . . . , a
N
t ), and a
i
t is the action taken by player i at time t. At start of period t, players
jointly observe at−1, and make private observations x, where x
i ∈ X i is the private observation of
player i.∀t ∈ 1, . . . T ,
Player i takes action ait ∈ A
i at time t upon observing a1:t−1 which is common information among
players, and xi which is player i’s private information. The sets Ai,X i are assumed to be finite. Let
gi = (git)t be a probabilistic strategy of player i where g
i
t : A
t−1 × (X i) → ∆(Ai) such that player i
plays action ait according to A
i
t ∼ g
i
t(·|a1:t−1, x
i). Let g := (gi)i∈N be a strategy profile of all players.
At the end of interval t, player i gets an instantaneous reward Rit(X,At). The objective of player i is
to maximize its total expected reward in a perfect sense
J i,g := Eg
[
T∑
t=1
Rit(X,At)
]
. (2)
III. STRUCTURAL RESULTS
The problem described in previous section is a repeated game with asymmetric information where
a player’s strategy is of the form ait ∼ g
i
t(·|a1:t−1, x
i). Equivalent of such decentralized problems when
players are cooperative and have the same objective can not be solved using classical tools from the
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5theory of Markov Decision Processes (MDP) [21]. However, there exists some key ideas in the literature
such as agent-by-agent approach [22] and common information approach [23] that present structural
results of the optimum policies for a class of such systems with non-classical information structure and
cooperative players. Such techniques have been used in dynamic team problems such as [24]–[26]. For
the problem described in previous section, we use an approach inspired by [23].
For every agent i ∈ N and any policy profile g, let pit ∈ ∆(X ) be a common belief on x conditioned
on the common information a1:t−1, defined as follows.
pit(x) := P
g(x = x|a1:t−1) (3)
A. Common agent approach
An alternative way to view the problem is as follows. As is done in common information ap-
proach [23], at time t, a fictitious common agent observes the common information a1:t−1 and gen-
erates prescription functions γt = (γ
i
t)i∈N = ψt[a1:t−1]. Player i uses these prescription functions
γit to operate on its private information x
i to produce its action ait, i.e. γ
i
t : x
i → ∆(Ai) and
ait ∼ γ
i
t(·|x
i) = ψ[a1:t−1](·|xi). It is easy to see that for any g policy profile of the players there
exists an equivalent ψ profile of the common agent (and vice versa) that generates the same control
actions for every realization of the information of the players.
We define a special type of common agent’s policy as follows. We call a common agent’s policy be
of type θ if the common agent observes the common belief pit derived from the common observation
a1:t−1, and generates prescription functions γt = (γ
i
t)i∈N = θt[pit]. Player i uses these prescription
function γit to operates on its private type x
i to produce its action ait, i.e. γ
i
t : ∆(X ) → ∆(A
i) and
ait ∼ γ
i
t(·|x
i) = θ[pit](·|xi). Equivalently, we call a common agent’s policy be of type θ if for all i ∈ N
and for all time t, player i’s action ait depends on its information (a1:t−1, x
i) through the belief states
pit(x) = P
θ(x = x|a1:t−1) and xi.
In the next lemma we show that for any given θ policy, the belief states pit can be updated recursively
as follows. Let pi1(x) := Q
x(x).
Lemma 1: For any given policy of type θ, there exists update functions Ft, independent of θ, such
that
pit+1 = Ft(pit, γt, at). (4)
Proof: Please see Appendix A.
IV. REPEATED GAMES WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
A. Solution concept: PBE
We introduce perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) as an appropriate equilibrium concept for the
game considered. Any history of this game at which players take action is of the form ht = (x, a1:t−1).
May 17, 2019 DRAFT
6Let Ht be the set of such histories at time t. At any time t player i observes h
i
t = (x
i, a1:t−1) and all
players together observe hct = (a1:t−1) as common history. Let H
i
t be the set of observed histories of
player i at time t and Hct be the set of common histories at time t. An appropriate concept of equilibrium
for such games is PBE [11] which consists of a pair (β∗, µ∗) of strategy profile β∗ = (β∗,it )t∈T ,i∈N
where β
∗,i
t : H
i
t → ∆(A
i) and a belief profile µ∗ = (iµ∗t )t∈T ,i∈N where
iµ∗t : H
i
t → ∆(Ht) that
satisfy sequential rationality so that ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , hit ∈ H
i
t, β
i
E
(β∗,iβ∗,−i, µ∗)
{
T∑
n=t
Rin(X,An)
∣∣∣hit
}
≥ E(β
iβ∗,−i, µ∗)
{
T∑
n=t
Rin(X,An)
∣∣∣hit
}
, (5)
and the beliefs are updated using Bayes’ rule, whenever possible.
In this paper, we first define a common belief pi∗t as a belief on x. Then player i derives its
equilibrium belief iµ∗t on (x
−i) by conditioning pi∗t on its private type x
i i.e. iµ∗t (x
−i) = pi∗t (x
−i|xi).
We define structured perfect Bayesian equilibrium as follows.
Definition 1 (SPBE): A structured perfect Bayesian equilibrium (SPBE) is a PBE of the considered
dynamic game where at any time t, for any agent i, its equilibrium strategy β
∗,i
t depends on player i’s
information (a1:t−1, x
i) through the common belief and its private type xi.
We conjecture that as in [14], such structured strategies form a rich class where any expected reward
profile of the players that can be generated from any general strategy profile can also be generated using
such structured strategy profile.
In the following we present a backward-forward methodology to compute SPBE of this game.
1) Backward Recursion: In this section, we define an equilibrium generating function θ =
(θit)i∈N ,t∈T and a sequence of functions (V
i
t )i∈N ,t∈{1,2,...T+1}, where V
i
t : ∆(X ) × X
i → R, in a
backward recursive way, as follows.
1. Initialize ∀piT+1 ∈ ∆(X ), x
i ∈ X i,
V iT+1(piT+1, x
i) := 0. (6)
2. For t = T, T − 1, . . . 1, ∀pit ∈ ∆(X ), let θt[pit] be generated as follows. Set γ˜t = θt[pit], where γ˜t
is the solution, if it exists5, of the following fixed-point equation, ∀i ∈ N , xi ∈ X i,
γ˜it(·|x
i) ∈ arg max
γit(·|x
i)
E
γit(·|x
i)γ˜−it , pit
{
Rit(X,At) + V
i
t+1(Ft(pit, γ˜t, At), x
i)
∣∣∣xi} , (7)
where expectation in (7) is with respect to random variables (X,At) through the measure∑
x−i,x pit(x
−i|xi)γit(a
i
t|x
i)γ˜−it (a
−i
t |x
−i), Ft is defined in Lemma 1. Furthermore, set
V it (pit, x
i) := Eγ˜
i
t(·|x
i)γ˜−it , pit
{
Rt
i(x,At) + V
i
t+1(Ft(pit, γ˜t, At), x
i)
∣∣∣xi} . (8)
It should be noted that (7) is a fixed-point equation where the solution of the above fixed-point equation
γ˜it appears in both, the left-hand-side and the right-hand-side of the equation. However, it is not the
outcome of the maximization operation as in a best response equation similar to that of a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium.
5Existence of general solution of this per stage fixed-point equation is discussed in Remark 4.
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72) Forward Recursion: Based on θ defined above in (6)–(8), we now construct a set of
strategies β∗ and beliefs µ∗ for the game D in a forward recursive way, as follows, where β
i,∗
t :
At−1×X i → ∆(Ai) and iµ∗t : A
t−1×X i → ∆(X ). We first define the update function of equilibrium
common belief pi∗t : A
t−1 → ∆(X ), where for every private history (a1:t−1, xi) of player i, it’s
equilibrium belief iµ∗t is constructed by conditioning common belief pi
∗
t on its private state x
i.
1. Initialize at time t = 0, ∀i ∈ N ,
pi∗1 [φ](x) := Q
x(x) (9)
2. For t = 1, 2 . . . T, i ∈ N , ∀a1:t−1, xi
β
∗,i
t (a
i
t|a1:t−1, x
i) := θit[pi
∗
t [a1:t−1]](a
i
t|x
i) (10a)
iµ∗t (x
−i|a1:t−1, x
i) := pi∗t [a1:t−1](x
−i|xi) (10b)
pi∗t+1[a1:t] := Ft(pi
∗
t [a1:t−1], θt[pi
∗
t [a1:t−1]], at) (10c)
where Ft is defined in Lemma 1.
In the following theorem, we show that the equilibrium strategy and belief profile (β∗, µ∗) defined
above constitute a PBE of the game considered.
Theorem 1: A strategy and belief profile (β∗, µ∗), constructed through backward/forward recursive
methodology is a PBE of the game, i.e. ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , (a1:t−1, xi), βit:T ,
E
β
∗,i
t:T
β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t
{
T∑
n=t
Rin(X,An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, xi
}
≥
E
βit:T β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t
{
T∑
n=t
Rin(X,An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, xi
}
. (11)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix B.
V. REMARKS
A few remarks are in order.
Remark 1: We note that in Step-2 in Backward Recursion, a fixed-point equation is solved in
(γ˜it , V
i
t )i∈N for each pit ∈ ∆(X ) and for each t ∈ T, T − 1, . . . 1. Since Backward recursion dominates
the computational complexity, the complexity of our methodology is linear in time. However, we do not
make any claim about the complexity of solving the fixed-point in each instant, which, together with
its existence as discussed below, is an important open question for future research.
Remark 2: We emphasize that even though the backward-forward methodology presented above
finds a class of equilibrium strategies that are structured i.e. depend on the common belief and private
state, the unilateral deviations of players in (11) are considered in the space of general strategies, i.e.,
the methodology does not make any bounded rationality assumptions.
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8Remark 3: Intuition of the proof: In such games, one could use the one-shot deviation principle [27]
to argue that sequential rationality reduces to showing that no player wants to deviate unilaterally in βit
at any time t, keeping the rest of the strategy β
i,∗
t+1:T as the equilibrium strategy. We argue that this is
equivalent to (7) i.e. for a given (pi∗t , x
i), a player’s unilateral deviation in its strategy βi,∗t is the same as
unilaterally deviation in its measure γit(·|x
i) on its action ait (and not on the whole function γ
i
t(·|·)). This
is because under such unilateral deviations, a player uses the same future information states (pi∗t+1, x
i)
as it would have done under an equilibrium strategy, whose update depends on equilibrium γ˜t. This is
so because player uses the same equilibrium pi∗t+1 to predict other player’s actions, and update of its
equilibrium private state xi does not depend on γit .
Remark 4: While it is known that for any finite dynamic game with asymmetric information and
perfect recall, there always exists a PBE [10, Prop. 249.1], existence of SPBE is not always guaranteed.
It is clear from our methodology that existence of SPBE boils down to existence of a solution to the
fixed-point equation (7) at every stage. Specifically, at each time t given the functions V it+1 for all i ∈ N
from the previous round (in the backwards recursion) equation (7) must have a solution γ˜it for all i ∈ N .
Generally, existence of equilibria is shown through Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, as is done by proving
existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of a finite game [10], [28]. This is done by showing
existence of fixed point of the best-response correspondences of the game. Among other conditions, it
requires the closed graph property of the correspondences, which is usually implied by the continuity
property of the utility functions involved. For (7) establishing existence is not straightforward due to:
(a) potential discontinuity of the pit update function Ft when the denominator in the Bayesian update is
0 and (b) potential discontinuity of the value functions, V it+1. It is noted in [17, ch. 5] through [29] that
for dynamic zero-sum games with asymmetric information, the value function is a continuous function,
on the basis of which and the above mentioned arguments, the existence of equilibria in sequential
decomposition fir such games is established. Furthermore, authors in [18] consider an LQG dynamic
game with asymmetric information (with linear state update, quadratic costs and Gaussian noise), where
they present sufficient algorithmic conditions for such an equilibrium to exist. Authors in [30] study
a public goods game for which signaling equilibria were found numerically using such methodology
where agents have independent types which are perfectly observed by them and agents observe each
others’ actions in each time-period. Having said this, existence of the fixed-point equation for a more
general class of problems remain an open question.
Remark 5: This model also allows to incorporate many bounded rationality models. Some examples
include using a discount factor δ or by restricting the search for optimum γit(·|x
i) in (7) in the space
of functions that are linear in private information variables.
Remark 6: In this paper, we considered a model with static types of the players. If the types of
the players were also dynamic, say in a Markovian or a controlled Markovian way, we believe such a
decomposition is not possible. The reason is that there is no consistent set of sufficient belief statistics
DRAFT May 17, 2019
9that summarizes the observed history of the players in such a way that does not lead to infinite regress
of beliefs. We pose it as an open problem if there exists any special structure of dynamic evolution
of private correlated states that allow for sequential decomposition in dynamic games with asymmetric
information.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered a model of repeated game where there is an underlying state of the
system that is static and players jointly observe actions of other players with delay 1 and correlated
private observations of the state of the system. Each player receives a reward that is a function of the state
and actions of all the players. We define a common information belief state and private information belief
states of the players. We then presented a backward-forward methodology similar to the one presented
in [1] to compute its structured perfect Bayesian equilibria (SPBE). Future work includes proving such a
methodology for discounted infinite-horizon case and specializing results to many practical settings such
as games on graph, where players who are connected on the graph have correlated private information.
Some practical applications of interest include security games for cyber-physical systems and Bayesian
learning games in a social network with fully rational and potentially adversarial agents. An important
future direction would to be investigate if this new result in the theory of such games can facilitate
more efficient way of computing equilibria in [6] which can have significant implications in developing
a software to solve real-world strategic problems.
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APPENDIX A
Lemma 2: There exists an update function Ft of pit, independent of θ
pit+1 = Ft(pit, γt, at) (12)
Proof:
pit+1(x) = P
θ(x|a1:t, γ1:t+1) (13a)
= P θ(x|a1:t, γ1:t) (13b)
=
P θ(x, at|a1:t−1, γ1:t)∑
x,at
P θ(x, at|a1:t−1, γ1:t)
(13c)
=
pit(x)
(∏N
i=1 γ
i
t(a
i
t|x
i)
)
∑
x pit(x)
∏N
i=1 γ
i
t(a
i
t|x
i)
(13d)
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10
if the denominator is not 0 and
pit+1(x) = pit(x) (13e)
otherwise. Thus we have,
pit+1 = Ft(pit, γt, at) (13f)
APPENDIX B
(PROOF OF THEOREM 1)
In the following theorem, we will assume that the equilibrium strategies and beliefs (β∗, µ∗) are
generated using an equilibrium function θ. Moreover, we will also use pi∗t map corresponding to
iµ∗t as
defined in (10). With slight abuse of notation, we use both beliefs and belief functions as superscripts on
expectations, where the reference is clear from the context. These functions when used as superscripts
in expectation denote the belief functions, which when applied on the conditioned random variables,
define beliefs on the random variables of interest inside the expectation.
Proof: We prove (11) using induction and from results in Lemma 3, 4 and 5 proved in
Appendix C. For base case at t = T , ∀i ∈ N , (a1:t−1, xi) ∈ HiT , β
i
E
β
∗,i
T
β
∗,−i
T
, pi∗T
{
Rit(X,At)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, xi}
= V iT (pi
∗
T [a1:t−1], x
i) (14a)
≥ Eβ
i
T β
∗,−i
T
, pi∗T
{
Rit(X,At)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, xi} (14b)
where (14a) follows from Lemma 5 and (14b) follows from Lemma 3 in Appendix C.
Let the induction hypothesis be that for t+ 1, ∀i ∈ N , (a1:t, xi) ∈ Hit+1, β
i,
E
β
∗,i
t+1:T
β
∗,−i
t+1:T
, pi∗t+1
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rin(X,An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, xi
}
≥
E
βit+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T
, pi∗t+1
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rin(X,An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, xi
}
. (15a)
Then ∀i ∈ N , (a1:t−1, xi) ∈ Hit, β
i, we have
E
β
∗,i
t:T
β
∗,−i
t:T
, pi∗t
{
T∑
n=t
Rin(X,An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, xi
}
= V it (pi
∗
t [a1:t−1], x
i) (16a)
≥ Eβ
i
tβ
∗,−i
t , pi
∗
t
{
Rit(X,At) + V
i
t+1(pi
∗
t+1[a1:t−1, At], x
i)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, xi} (16b)
= Eβ
i
tβ
∗,−i
t , pi
∗
t
{
Rit(X,At) + E
β
∗,i
t+1:T
β
∗,−i
t+1:T
, pi∗t+1
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rin(X,An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, At, xi
}∣∣∣a1:t−1, xi
}
(16c)
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≥ Eβ
i
tβ
∗,−i
t , pi
∗
t
{
Rit(X,At) + E
βit+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T
pi∗t+1
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rin(X,An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, At, xi
}∣∣∣a1:t−1, xi
}
(16d)
= Eβ
i
tβ
∗,−i
t , pi
∗
t
{
Rit(X,At) + E
βit:T β
∗,−i
t:T
pi∗t
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rin(X,An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, At, xi
}∣∣∣a1:t−1, xi
}
(16e)
= Eβ
i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T
, pi∗t
{
T∑
n=t
Rin(X,An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, xi
}
, (16f)
where (16a) follows from Lemma 5, (16b) follows from Lemma 3, (16c) follows from Lemma 5, (16d)
follows from induction hypothesis in (15a) and (16e) follows from Lemma 4.
APPENDIX C
As we did in the previous theorem, in the following lemmas, we would assume that the equilib-
rium strategies and beliefs (β∗, µ∗) are generated using an equilibrium function θ. We also use pi∗t
corresponding to iµ∗t as defined in (10).
Lemma 3: This lemma states that the reward that player i would get on playing equilibrium strategy
will be greater or equal to the reward it would get if it deviates only at time t, keeping the rest of its
strategy as equilibrium strategy. ∀t ∈ T , i ∈ N , (a1:t−1, xi) ∈ Hit, β
i
t
V it (pi
∗
t [a1:t−1], x
i) ≥ Eβ
i
tβ
∗,−i
t , pi
∗
t
{
Rit(X,At) + V
i
t+1(pi
∗
t+1[a1:t−1, At])
∣∣∣a1:t−1, xi} (17)
Proof: We prove this lemma by contradiction.
Suppose the claim is not true for t. This implies ∃i, βˆit, aˆ1:t−1, x
i such that
E
βˆitβ
∗,−i
t , pi
∗
t
{
Rit(X,At) + V
i
t+1(pi
∗
t+1[aˆ1:t−1, At])
∣∣∣aˆ1:t−1, xi}
> V it (pi
∗
t [aˆ1:t−1]). (18)
We will show that this contradicts the definition of V it in (8).
Construct γˆit(a
i
t|x
i) = βˆit(a
i
t|aˆ1:t−1, x
i)
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Then for aˆ1:t−1, x
i, we have
V it (pi
∗
t [aˆ1:t−1])
< Eβˆ
i
t,β
∗,−i
t ,pi
∗
t ,x
i
{
Rit(X,At) + V
i
t+1(pi
∗
t+1[aˆ1:t−1, At])
∣∣∣aˆ1:t−1, xi} (19a)
=
∑
x,at,at,
xi,x−i
[
Rit(X,At) + V
i
t+1(pit+1[aˆ1:t−1, at])
]
pi∗t [aˆ1:t−1](x
−i|xi)βˆit(a
i
t|aˆ1:t−1, x
i)β∗,−it (a
−i
t |pi
∗
t [aˆ1:t−1], x
−i)
(19b)
=
∑
x,at,xi,x−i
[
Rit(X,At) + V
i
t+1(pit+1[aˆ1:t−1, at])
]
pi∗t [aˆ1:t−1](x
−i|xi)γˆit(a
i
t|x
i)β∗,−it (a
−i
t |pi
∗
t [aˆ1:t−1], x
−i)
(19c)
= Eγˆ
i
t(·|x
i)β∗,−it , pi
∗
t [aˆ1:t−1]
{
Rit(X,At) + V
i
t+1(pi
∗
t+1[aˆ1:t−1, At])
∣∣∣xi} (19d)
≤ max
γit(·|x
i)
E
γit(·|x
i)β∗,−it , pi
∗
t [aˆ1:t−1]
{
Rit(X,At) + V
i
t+1(pi
∗
t+1[aˆ1:t−1, At])
∣∣∣xi} (19e)
= V it (pi
∗
t [aˆ1:t−1]) (19f)
where (19a) follows from (18), (19c) follows from the definition of γˆit , and (19f) follows from the
definition of V it in (8).
Lemma 4: ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , (a1:t, xi) ∈ Hit+1 and β
i
t
E
βit:T β
∗,−i
t:T
, pi∗t
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rin(X,An)
∣∣∣a1:t, xi
}
=
E
βit+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T
, pi∗t+1
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rin(X,An)
∣∣∣a1:t, xi
}
. (20)
Proof: Since the above expectations involve random variables X−i, At+1:T , we consider
P β
i
t:T β
∗,−i
t:T
, pi∗t (x, at+1:T
∣∣∣a1:t, xi).
P β
i
t:Tβ
∗,−i
t:T
, pi∗t (x, at+1:T
∣∣∣a1:t, xi) = P βit:T β∗,−it:T , pi∗t (x∣∣∣a1:t, xi)P βit:T β∗,−it:T , pi∗t (at+1:T ∣∣∣x, a1:t) (21a)
We first note that
P β
i
t:Tβ
∗,−i
t:T
, pi∗t (at+1:T
∣∣∣x, a1:t) (21b)
= βit+1(a
i
t+1|a1:t−1, x
i)
(
β
∗,−i
t+1 (a
−i
t+1|a1:t−1, x
−i)
)
P β
i
t:Tβ
∗,−i
t:T
, pi∗t (at+2:T
∣∣∣a1:t, x) (21c)
= P β
i
t+1:Tβ
∗,−i
t+1:T
, pi∗t+1(at+1:T |a1:t, x) (21d)
Thus using the above equation, (21a) is given by
P β
i
t+1:Tβ
∗,−i
t+1:T
, pi∗t+1(x, at+1:T |a1:t−1, x
i) = P β
i
t+1:T β
∗,−i
t+1:T
, pi∗t+1(x, at+1:T |a1:t−1, x
i). (21e)
Lemma 5: ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , a1:t−1 ∈ Hct , x
i ∈ (X i)
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V it (pi
∗
t [a1:t−1], x
i) = Eβ
∗,i
t:T
β
∗,−i
t:T
,pi∗t
{
T∑
n=t
Rin(X,An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, xi
}
. (22)
Proof:
We prove the lemma by induction. For t = T ,
E
β
∗,i
T
β
∗,−i
T
, pi∗T
{
Rit(X,At)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, xi}
=
∑
x−i,aT ,x−i
Rit(X,At)pi
∗
T [a1:t−1](x
−i|xi)β∗,iT (a
i
T |a1:t−1, x
i)β∗,−iT (a
−i
T |a1:t−1, x
−i) (23a)
= V iT (pi
∗
t [a1:t−1], x
i), (23b)
where (23b) follows from the definition of V it in (8) and the definition of β
∗
T in the forward recursion
in (10). Suppose the claim is true for t+ 1, i.e., ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , (a1:t−1, xi) ∈ Hit+1
V it+1(pi
∗
t+1[a1:t], x
i) = Eβ
∗,i
t+1:T
β
∗,−i
t+1:T
, pi∗t+1
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rin(X,An)
∣∣∣a1:t, xi
}
. (24)
Then ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , (a1:t−1, xi) ∈ Hit, we have
E
β
∗,i
t:T
β
∗,−i
t:T
, pi∗t
{
T∑
n=t
Rin(X,An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, xi
}
= Eβ
∗,i
t:T
β
∗,−i
t:T
, pi∗t
{
Rit(X,At) + E
β
∗,i
t:T
β
∗,−i
t:T
, pi∗t ,x
i
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rin(X,An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, At, xi
}∣∣∣a1:t−1, xi
}
(25a)
= Eβ
∗,i
t:T
β
∗,−i
t:T
, pi∗t
{
Rit(X,At) + E
β
∗,i
t+1:T
β
∗,−i
t+1:T
, pi∗t+1
{
T∑
n=t+1
Rin(X,An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, At, xi
}∣∣∣a1:t−1, xi
}
(25b)
= Eβ
∗,i
t:T
β
∗,−i
t:T
, pi∗t
{
Rit(X,At) + V
i
t+1(pi
∗
t+1[a1:t−1, At], x
i)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, xi} (25c)
= Eβ
∗,i
t β
∗,−i
t , pi
∗
t
{
Rit(X,At) + V
i
t+1(pi
∗
t+1[a1:t−1, At], x
i)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, xi} (25d)
= V it (pi
∗
t [a1:t−1], x
i) (25e)
where (25b) follows from Lemma 4 in Appendix C, (25c) follows from the induction hypothesis in
(24), (25d) follows because the random variables involved in expectation, X,At do not depend on
β
∗,i
t+1:Tβ
∗,−i
t+1:T and (25e) follows from the definition of V
i
t in (8).
REFERENCES
[1] D. Vasal and A. Anastasopoulos, “A systematic process for evaluating structured perfect Bayesian
equilibria in dynamic games with asymmetric information,” Tech. Rep., Aug. 2015. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1508.06269
[2] G. A. Akerlof, “The market for” lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism,” The quarterly
journal of economics, pp. 488–500, 1970.
May 17, 2019 DRAFT
14
[3] M. Spence, “Job market signaling,” The quarterly journal of Economics, pp. 355–374, 1973.
[4] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, “Perfect bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium,” journal of Economic
Theory, vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 236–260, 1991.
[5] D. Silver, J. Schrittwieser, K. Simonyan, I. Antonoglou, A. Huang, A. Guez, T. Hubert, L. Baker, M. Lai,
A. Bolton et al., “Mastering the game of go without human knowledge,” Nature, vol. 550, no. 7676, p. 354,
2017.
[6] N. Brown and T. Sandholm, “Safe and nested subgame solving for imperfect-information games,” in Advances
in Neural Information Processing Systems 30, I. Guyon, U. V. Luxburg, S. Bengio, H. Wallach, R. Fergus,
S. Vishwanathan, and R. Garnett, Eds. Curran Associates, Inc., 2017, pp. 689–699. [Online]. Available:
http://papers.nips.cc/paper/6671-safe-and-nested-subgame-solving-for-imperfect-information-games.pdf
[7] L. S. Shapley, “Stochastic games,” Proceedings of the national academy of sciences, vol. 39, no. 10, pp.
1095–1100, 1953.
[8] T. Bas¸ar and G. Olsder, Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory, 2nd Edition. Society for Industrial and
Applied Mathematics, 1998.
[9] J. Filar and K. Vrieze, Competitive Markov decision processes. Springer Science & Business Media, 2012.
[10] M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, ser. MIT Press Books. The MIT Press, 1994,
vol. 1.
[11] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
[12] G. J. Mailath and L. Samuelson, Repeated games and reputations: long-run relationships. Oxford university
press, 2006.
[13] E. Maskin and J. Tirole, “Markov perfect equilibrium: I. observable actions,” Journal of Economic Theory,
vol. 100, no. 2, pp. 191–219, 2001.
[14] D. Vasal, A. Sinha, and A. Anastasopoulos, “A systematic process for evaluating structured perfect bayesian
equilibria in dynamic games with asymmetric information,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2018.
[15] D. Vasal and A. Anastasopoulos, “A systematic process for evaluating structured perfect Bayesian equilibria in
dynamic games with asymmetric information,” in American Control Conference, Boston, US, 2016, available
on arXiv.
[16] Y. Ouyang, H. Tavafoghi, and D. Teneketzis, “Dynamic games with asymmetric information: Common
information based perfect bayesian equilibria and sequential decomposition,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 222–237, 2017.
[17] H. T. Jahormi, “On design and analysis of cyber-physical systems with strategic agents,” Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 2017.
[18] D. Vasal and A. Anastasopoulos, “Signaling equilibria of dynamic LQG games with asymmetric information,”
in Conference on Decision and Control, 2016.
[19] ——, “Decentralized Bayesian learning in dynamic games,” in Allerton Conference on Communication,
Control, and Computing, 2016. [Online]. Available: https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.06847
[20] H. Tavafoghi, Y. Ouyang, and D. Teneketzis, “On stochastic dynamic games with delayed sharing information
structure,” in Decision and Control (CDC), 2016 IEEE 55th Conference on. IEEE, 2016, pp. 7002–7009.
[21] P. Kumar and P. Varaiya, “Stochastic systems,” 1986.
[22] Y.-C. Ho, “Team decision theory and information structures,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 68, no. 6, pp.
644–654, 1980.
DRAFT May 17, 2019
15
[23] A. Nayyar, A. Mahajan, and D. Teneketzis, “Decentralized stochastic control with partial history sharing: A
common information approach,” Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 58, no. 7, pp. 1644–1658,
2013.
[24] A. Mahajan, “Optimal decentralized control of coupled subsystems with control sharing,” Automatic Control,
IEEE Transactions on, vol. 58, no. 9, pp. 2377–2382, 2013.
[25] A. Mahajan and D. Teneketzis, “On the design of globally optimal communication strategies for real-time
communcation systems with noisy feedback,” IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun., no. 4, pp. 580–595, May 2008.
[26] D. Vasal and A. Anastasopoulos, “Stochastic control of relay channels with cooperative and strategic users,”
IEEE Transactions on Communications, vol. 62, no. 10, pp. 3434–3446, Oct 2014.
[27] E. Hendon, H. J. Jacobsen, and B. Sloth, “The one-shot-deviation principle for sequential rationality,” Games
and Economic Behavior, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 274–282, 1996.
[28] J. Nash, “Non-cooperative games,” Annals of mathematics, pp. 286–295, 1951.
[29] P. R. Milgrom and R. J. Weber, “Distributional strategies for games with incomplete information,” Mathematics
of operations research, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 619–632, 1985.
[30] D. Vasal, A. Sinha, and A. Anastasopoulos, “A systematic process for evaluating structured perfect Bayesian
equilibria in dynamic games with asymmetric information,” Tech. Rep., Aug. 2015. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1508.06269v3
May 17, 2019 DRAFT
